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Plaintiff Julia Lee Askew, through her counsel of record, respectfully submits this
Response in Opposition to Defendant Paul Hardman's Petition for Rehearing.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Paul Hardman ("Hardman") has requested a rehearing in connection with this
Court's opinion issued on October 11, 1994. Hardman's petition should be denied. Despite
Hardman's assertion that this Court misapprehended virtually every legal principle related to the
Court's opinion, there simply is no basis for Hardman's petition or his unfounded assertions.
Every issue that Hardman raises in his Petition was either briefed by the parties, raised in oral
argument before this Court, or is irrelevant.

Moreover, this Court's decision is entirely

consistent with the majority of courts that have addressed the discoverability of insurance files,
as well as the modern trend of courts that are facing this issue for the first time.

More

importantly, this Court's opinion comports with principles articulated by the Utah Supreme
Court relating to the work product doctrine-principles that were thoroughly treated in the
parties' briefs and in this Court's opinion.
Defendant Hardman also requests rehearing regarding this Court's remand of the case
for a new trial. This issue was fully briefed and argued, and this Court's opinion fully and
properly addresses the issue of prejudice as well as justice's mandate of a new trial. In any
event, Julie Askew suffered clear prejudice as a result of having been denied access to crucial
evidence.
Finally, defendant seriously overstates the breadth of this Court's ruling and the
purported impact of the ruling on insurance claim practices in Utah. When the rhetoric is set
aside, the arguments of the defense boil down to a claim that insurance companies and their
1

insureds should enjoy special discovery protections not afforded anyone else. Such unique
protections simply do not and should not exist.

This Court should deny the Petition for

Rehearing.
DISCUSSION
I.

THIS COURT APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
ITS DECISION IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH STATE v. PENA.
Hardman asserts that this Court failed to consider the Utah Supreme Court's decision in

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Hardman, however, does not articulate a single
reason why application of the Pena analysis would impact this Court's decision. In fact, this
Court's decision is entirely consistent with Pena.
A.
A "De Novo" Standard of Review Applies to the Trial Court's Articulation
of the Work Product Doctrine.
At the most fundamental level, there are only two types of questions that an appellate
court must decide in reviewing a lower court decision—those of fact and those of law. Pena, 869
P.2d 935.

A trial court's determination of fact will not be overturned unless "clearly

erroneous." Id. at 935-36. This standard is wholly inapplicable in this appeal because the
decision at issue did not involve the resolution of any disputed facts.
Questions of law are reviewed by the appellate court for "correctness." Id. at 936.
"Controlling Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides the
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." Id.
Nevertheless, Pena establishes that "a de facto grant of discretion" is inherent in some questions
of law, permitting "the trial court to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal
effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal." Id. Thus, with respect to questions
2

party "was unhappy with the way the project had ended up from their standpoint, and was
threatening litigation." Gold Standard, 805 P.2d at 170. The Gold Standard court clearly
disregarded the preparer's subjective state of mind, however, and focused instead on objective
evidence that demonstrated that, while litigation was possible-even vaguely threatened, there
was no specific threat demonstrating the opposing party's intent to pursue litigation or that such
litigation was imminent. Id. The court held that "a letter whose tone is 'threatening' but does
not state an intent to pursue litigation is insufficient to allow a party to invoke work product
protection to protect an in house report prompted by the letter." Id. To this end, the court also
noted that "[t]he mere possibility that litigation may occur or even 'the mere fact that litigation
does eventually ensue' is insufficient to cloak material with the mantle of work product
protection." Id.
Hardman, who did not even prepare the disputed evidence, has produced no evidence that
his fear "of being sued" was founded upon anything more than the possibility that litigation
might follow from the accident. Moreover, Hardman's insurer can point to no more than the
mere possibility of litigation as the motivating force behind its recording of Hardman's
statements. Litigation was not pending, impending, or even threatened when Hardman made the
statements recorded by his insurer. Hence, the requested documents were not prepared "in
anticipation of litigation" as that requirement is clearly articulated in Gold Standard. A contrary
holding would effectively cloak every document created in every investigation of every accident
(whether or not by an insurance investigator) with a work product privilege-a result clearly
rejected by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.

7

III.

THIS COURT DID NOT MISAPPREHEND THE IMPACT OF ITS DECISION
UPON INSURANCE CLAIM PRACTICES.
The defendant argues that this Court's ruling will have a major impact on insurance claim

practices in Utah, but the rhetoric is without substance. The defense simply wants insurance
companies to enjoy special discovery protections not afforded to anyone else.
Hardman asserts that this Court's decision, when read in connection with its decision in
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.. 840 P.2d 130, 138 (UtahCt. App. 1992), "creates
a fundamental inconsistency." In short, Hardman argues that an insurer's obligation to produce
an investigative report is "fundamentally inconsistent" with an insurer's duty to defend its
insured. In fact, Hardman goes so far as to suggest that requiring an insurer to produce its
investigative reports makes the insurer the agent for the third-party claimant.

Hardman's

argument is ill-founded and unpersuasive.
The existence of a fiduciary relationship does not exempt a party from the obligations of
discovery, nor does it render application of the rules of discovery unfair.4 A fiduciary-insurer
is not required to produce anything more than the rules of discovery require of the principalinsured. As demonstrated in Gold Standard, discovery rules require a principal-party to produce
investigative reports that are not prepared "in anticipation of litigation." Excepting the fact that
the investigative report in this case was prepared by a representative instead of the principal, it

4

If the existence of a fiduciary relationship is sufficient to exempt a party from discovery,
then an investigative report prepared by a party's business partner would also be protected by
the work product doctrine because of the fiduciary nature of that relationship, regardless of
whether the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation. Where the "anticipation of
litigation" standard is not satisfied, neither the rules of procedure governing work product nor
the case law extends special work product protections to fiduciary relationships, including
attorney-client relationships. See, e.g.. Rule 26(b)(3).
8

is no different than the internally generated investigation at issue in Gold Standard. See id. at
171. Thus, it warrants no special protection. Like the investigative reports at issue in Madsen
v. United Television, Inc.. 801 P.2d 912 (Utah 1990), an insurer's investigation is "undertaken
not in anticipation of litigation but rather as a routine practice,'" id. at 917, for without such an
investigation an insurer can neither evaluate a claim nor determine coverage. An insurer simply
cannot claim that its initial investigative reports are "material that would not have been generated
but for the pendency or imminence of litigation" as required under Madsen. Id.
In short, this Court's ruling does no more than establish that a principal-insured may not
avoid the burdens of discovery because the preparation of the investigative report is
accomplished by a fiduciary-insurer. The law simply does not favor those who have a fiduciary
to do their bidding over those who do not.5

Defense efforts to secure special discovery

protections to insurers is painfully evident in the claimed distinction between first-party and
third-party insurance claims. Reiving upon Weitzman v. Blazing Pedals, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 125
(D.Colo. 1993), Hardman asserts that third-party claims should be treated differently with
respect to the work product doctrine. According to the Weitzman court, this distinction is
required because of "the adversarial nature of the relationship between an insurer and a third
party claimant. . . ." Id. at 126. The "adversarial nature" of a relationship, however, does not

5

Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not dictate a different result, for
its protection extends only to those items that are "prepared in anticipation of litigation." Where
that standard is met, the protections of the work product rule are extended, regardless of whether
the item was prepared by the party or its attorney, insurer, or agent. Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Where, as here, that standard is not met, the item must be produced.

9

inform the "anticipation of litigation" inquiry. The principles of subrogation themselves dictate
that an insurer can be no more adverse to a third-party claimant than its insured. Yet, Hardman
argues that an insurer, because of its role as a fiduciary, is entitled to "work product" protection
that would be unavailable to its insured-protection that would shelter communications between
an insurer and its insured regardless of whether those communications were in "anticipation of
litigation." Such protection is more akin to the attorney-client privilege than the work product
doctrine, and it should not be extended through an over-reaching application of an otherwise
narrow exception to the rules of discovery.6
IV.

THIS COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE BURDEN OF PROOF,
Hardman argues that this Court misapprehended the burden of proving harmless error.

His petition, however, virtually ignores the substantial portion of this Court's decision, including
the cases cites by this Court, that addresses that very issue.7

This Court thoroughly and

properly analyzed and applied the legal principles on burden of proof. Hardman's Petition for
Rehearing brings nothing new to this issue.

6

Notwithstanding the reliance on the fiduciary nature of an insurer's duty, the defense
cannot escape the reality that insurers themselves frequently use information communicated by
their insured "for purposes inimical to the interests of the[ir] insured," see Langdon v.
Champion,752 P.2d 999, 1003 (Alaska 1988), such as when they deny coverage in a third-party
context. The insurer-insured relationship is thus dramatically different from that of attorneyclient. Moreover, Askew submits that an insurer's fiduciary duty does not create an obligation
to hide facts suggesting its insured's liability that are properly sought through discovery.
7

Hardman claims he was not aware or advised that he had "the burden of proving 'harmless
error' until [this Court] ruled in this case." [Petition for Rehearing at 10.] Such a claim could
be made with respect to virtually every issue ever appealed. Both parties discussed the issue of
harmless error in their briefs, and counsel for both parties responded to questions from the Court
on this issue during oral argument.
10

V.

EVEN IF PLAINTIFF HAD THE BURDEN OF SHOWING PREJUDICE, SUCH
A SHOWING COULD CLEARLY BE MADE.
As this Court properly noted in its ruling, Askew could hardly be expected to prove

prejudicial error because she was never given access to the disputed documents. Nevertheless,
based on the incomplete disclosures contained in the Petition alone,8 Askew could easily
demonstrate significant prejudice to the preparation and presentation of her case even if such a
showing were required.
For example, the failure to disclose the recorded statement deprived Askew of significant
evidence of Hardman's negligence-that he had not inspected the fence for three to four days
prior to the accident despite repeated incidents of horses escaping. The transcript indicates that
on the morning following the accident Hardman stated:
Well, that fence was up last Thursday, which was 4 days ago UNCLEAR time
I was over here plowing and see this UNCLEAR plowing on, I was over here
plowing and checked the fence on Thursday and then of course they got out now.

Q. Okay, now you say ah, you were here last Thursday plowing this field and
the wire, fence was up that day, that was just the previous Thursday, this being
Tuesday and the accident happened Monday night okay.
A. So it would have been three days prior.9

8

After aggressively resisting disclosure of Hardman's recorded statement for years,
Hardman has now appended a purported transcript of that statement to his Petition for
Rehearing.
9

Assuming Hardman checked the fences late in the evening on Thursday, four days - not
three - passed between Thursday evening and the accident, which occurred the following
Monday night at approximately 7:20 p.m.
11

Transcription Statement at 1-2.10
Hardman also told the insurance adjuster that "ever since the deer season we've had a
lot of problems with hunters coming in over here on this north pasture" [Transcription Statement
at p. I], 11 that his fence had been taken down four times that fall, three times before the evening
of the accident [Transcription Statement at pp. 2, 4], and that his horses "got out about every
time" the fence was down. [Id. at p.4.]
At trial, Hardman testified, inconsistent with the recorded transcript, that he had checked
the fence at the location where his horses escaped at 4:30 p.m. on the evening of the accident
[Trial Transcript at 150] and that he had checked the fence daily for two to three weeks before
the accident [Id. at p. 152].12 Askew had no ability to challenge that important testimony, and
demonstrate the existence of key contrary evidence, because she was denied access to the
recorded conversation.
Based on this evidence, Askew could have argued at trial, and the jury could have found,
that Hardman was negligent in not inspecting his fences regularly and in allowing four days to
10

Because Askew has never had access to the recording, she does not know whether the
transcript is complete or accurate or whether those missing portions of the transcription attached
to Hardman's Petition, designated "UNCLEAR," could be provided by listening to the recording
or by professional enhancement of the recording.
11

The accident occurred on November 20, 1989. The general deer season in Utah started
on the third Saturday in October, 1989. Additional special hunts continued in the state for
several weeks after the general season ended. In fact, Paul Hardman had planned to leave on
a deer hunting trip on the morning following the accident. See Paul Hardman Depo. (Vol. I)
at 84-85.
12

While the insurance adjuster apparently did not specifically ask Hardman whether he had
checked the fence on the day of the accident, it is inconceivable that Hardman would tell the
adjuster about a date four days prior to the accident while ignoring more recent inspections that
would have been far more relevant.
12

go by without checking his fences, particularly in light of the time of the year, the fact that the
pasture was still accessible by vehicle, and the three recent instances of the fence being down
(in the same place it was down at the time of the accident) and his horses' prior escapes.
With access to Hardman's recorded statement, Julie Askew also reasonably could have
argued that the fence was down up to four days before the accident. This argument would have
been corroborated by a statement in Officer Jerry Monson's report that he observed "OLD TIRE
TRACKS" in the vicinity where the fence was down [Utah County Offense Report at p.l
(attached as Exhibit "B" to Hardman's Petition)] and Hardman's testimony that he could not say
the tracks had not been made on some prior date (Paul Hardman Depo. (Vol. I) at 117), and that
the deer entrails he observed approximately one-fourth of a mile from the place where his horses
escaped the pasture were almost gone, having been eaten by magpies, when he first observed
them early on the morning following the accident [Hardman Depo., Vol. I, at 106-107].
Instead, when Hardman's counsel argued at trial that "trespassers" broke down the fence on the
very evening of the accident and scared the horses out of the pasture, Askew had no effective
way to counter this argument.
Similarly, Askew was deprived of an important source of key impeachment evidence.
At trial, Hardman testified inconsistently with his deposition testimony regarding problems with
trespassers in the weeks preceding the accident. When Askew's counsel attempted to impeach
Hardman with his contrary deposition testimony, Hardman explained the inconsistency by stating
that the testimony elicited in his deposition came after long hours of cross-examination at a time

13

when he was tired and not thinking sharply. Hardman's statements made the morning after the
accident constitute important impeachment evidence of which Askew was deprived.13
As have other courts, this Court properly recognized that, under the circumstances of this
case, Askew should not bear the burden of showing prejudice as a result of her being deprived
of key evidence. Even if she bore that burden, however, Askew can easily demonstrate far
more than the "colorable indication" of prejudice requested in Justice Orme's dissent.
VI.

HARDMAN HAS VASTLY OVERSTATED THE BREADTH OF THIS COURT'S
RULING.
Hardman argues that this Court's ruling requires the production of all documents in an

insurance adjuster's files, including documents containing the mental impressions of adjusters
and/or documents created after the date Askew filed her claim. To the contrary, the Court and
the parties focused on the investigative file, including particularly the recorded statement.
Specifically, this Court held:
Defendant has therefore failed to demonstrate that the documents were prepared
to assist in pending or impending litigation. At most, defendant has demonstrated
that the documents were prepared in the course of an accident investigation.
Adjuster Harmon's report is therefore not entitled to work-product protection and
the trial court erred by refusing to compel its production.
[Opinion at 7.]

13

As recognized by this Court's opinion, Askew did not have the burden of proving
prejudicial error on appeal. Moreover, because she was denied access to the transcript of the
conversation on the morning following the accident, she was precluded from establishing actual
prejudice resulting from the denial of relevant discovery. Accordingly, those portions of the
trial transcript that reflect these inconsistencies in Hardman's testimony are not part of the record
designated on appeal.
14

To the extent the insurance file contains other documents that are in fact protected, such
as communications with counsel or an insurance adjuster's mental impressions regarding pending
or impending litigation, the ruling does not require the production of such documents. This
Court responded to~and properly rejected--the trial court's blanket, per se work product ruling
protecting from disclosure every document contained in the insurance file. This Court's ruling
does not, however, mandate the production of every document in the file. Rather, it places the
burden on Hardman to demonstrate that other documents in the insurance file are in fact
protected by privilege.
CONCLUSION
This case was fully and adequately briefed, argued, and decided by this Court. This
Court did not misapprehend the law or the facts. To the contrary, as explained in detail in the
opinion itself, this Court's statement of the law is entirely consistent with the majority of the
courts that have addressed the issue. More importantly, the Court's decision correctly applies
Utah law.
This Court's application of the law to the facts not only is legally correct, it also is just.
Irrespective of who bears the burden of showing the existence of nonexistence of prejudice,
Askew has demonstrated clear prejudice resulting from the trial court's erroneous denial of
Askew's access to highly relevant evidence.
There is no ground for reconsideration. Insurance companies and their insureds do not,
should not, and, in accordance with Utah law, cannot, enjoy special discovery immunities not
accorded anyone else.

This Court's opinion is well-reasoned, well-articulated, and correct.

Defendant Hardman's request for reconsideration should be denied.
15

DATED this \\K. day of November, 1994.
KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Gary A. Dodge, Esq.
Mark F. James, Esq.
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